Outside the Plastic Box: part 1
Process
Many different perspectives were shared in response to our earlier LinkedIn post about whether the INC on plastic pollution should finally conclude after four years (and 6-9 or more rounds of negotiations, depending on how/what you count), with little progress on many elements of a future treaty. While many respondents agreed that existing international treaties and other instruments could be used more effectively, some disagreed, as expected.
We hope these posts clarify our perspective and encourage further discussion. They are divided into two parts: first on the process, highlighting three main points—(1) participation, (2) forum shopping, and (3) the idea of looking “outside the UN” on plastics; and then on the substance, also with three points—which is posted separately here.
Participation
1. A principle, a human right – and missing
For years, the chemicals and waste cluster has been a frontrunner in operationalizing the principle of public participation in international negotiations. SAICM was a wonderful example, albeit a non-binding framework (that had more ambition than direction), which has now morphed into the (better-oriented) Global Framework on Chemicals (GFC). Under SAICM and the GFC, governments, civil society, labor unions, and industry all work together in a messy but exciting way to advance various topics on toxic chemicals and pollution.
It is unfortunate that negotiations over a new instrument on plastic pollution (the plastics INC) have set a regressive precedent, particularly after the UN General Assembly recognized the human right to a healthy environment in 2022 (A/RES/76/300). In paragraph 3 of that Resolution, the UN General Assembly affirmed that the right to a healthy environment requires the “full” implementation of the long-standing principle of participation under international environmental law, which most States also recognize as a core human right to meaningful participation under various human rights treaties.
Negotiations have become increasingly less participatory, with little to show for it. For example, at INC-4, which took place on the traditional lands of First Nations of what is now Canada, Indigenous Peoples made a powerful demand to simply express their views on the impacts they endure from plastic pollution. They succeeded, but only after a long, unnecessarily tense exchange and showdown with the chair and secretariat. Now, at least until the next INC in March 2027, a series of Heads of Delegation meetings have been held and will continue to be held without the participation of observers. That is not how one builds trust, faith, and integrity in international instruments to deliver on the mandate provided to them over time.
2. The paralysis of forum shopping
Forum shopping can make dialogue, discourse, and diplomacy disappear, freezing negotiations. Ongoing negotiations over a possible plastics treaty are being used to block discussions about plastics within existing instruments, including those with agreed-upon obligations and mechanisms that are highly relevant to preventing plastic pollution.
A recent example is the 2026 OEWG-15 of the Basel Convention, where a Swiss proposal, supported by many States, to discuss Art. 4 as it relates to plastics was stonewalled in unprecedented form. Not even a contact group could be formed to discuss the proposal by several countries. In the end, parties agreed to bring the discussion on the article to the next Conference of the Parties (COP), but without any explicit reference to plastics. More on that opportunity is discussed in part 2 of this series.
3. Moving “outside the UN” is unlikely to accelerate action
In terms of possible solutions, I'm not convinced that negotiating a plastics treaty outside the UN, especially without China, India, Russia, and the United States, as well as key Gulf States, would lead to anything truly impactful.
When we look at past precedents of going outside the UN, they are not all that persuasive. A recent report mentions two examples. Comparing the Ramsar Convention (1971) and the Ottawa Process under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) (1997) to international efforts to end plastic pollution involves quite different contexts – geopolitically, economically, and from a technical perspective.
Regardless, these examples make it clear that participation in extra-UN processes is key. Would major producers such as China, India, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the United States participate? They represent most of the upstream and midstream side of plastic production today. Woud an outcome without their participation matter? Consider the Bamako Convention, formed following the African Group’s disappointment with the Basel Convention. It is powerful and ambitious, but poorly ratified and implemented. Would plastic producers join an agreement that had any implication for production if they were not part of the discussions?
Even if part of it, would they ratify any agreement that is not consensus-based? An instrument ratified by major plastic-producing and consuming States that has the capacity to restrict production and allows voting on decisions (i.e., not requiring consensus) seems a dream far removed from reality.
Even if these and other States did not ratify an eventual agreement, that would not prevent them from hindering progress. Indeed, some countries have been quite successful in their objective of weakening, delaying, or destroying progress, despite not being a Party or Member State.